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SUMMARY 
When citizens lose faith in their government’s refugee policies, there arises the 
potential for an anti-immigration backlash, as several European countries have 
recently discovered. Canada has yet to see that happen, but it has for too long 
been muddling along with a refugee-processing system that is seriously flawed. 
Refugees go unprocessed for years, and in the meantime end up living, working 
and laying down roots. Often that only increases the chances they will end up 
staying even if they might have otherwise been rejected. It may even lead to 
increases in questionable refugee claims, as people realize they can work and 
make money in Canada for years before their case is even heard.
The Canadian government has committed to increasing refugee numbers. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has designated Canada as the 
primary destination for hard-to-settle refugees. The diversity of source countries 
is increasing, resulting in more refugees who are illiterate in both English and 
French. More refugees will struggle to adapt to life in Canada. Taken together, it 
is possible that without fixing the problems in the system, public dissatisfaction 
could rise as Canadians lose faith that their refugee system is under control, and 
that could undermine their faith in the entire immigration system.
The biggest flaw in the refugee system traces back to the government’s 
overreaction to the Singh decision. The Supreme Court ordered that all rejected 
refugees had a right to an in-person appeal, but the federal government went 
much further and gave every refugee an in-person hearing. That system has 
left Canada with a backlog, as of last year, of 34,000 cases. In most every other 
country, initial refugee screenings are conducted by public servants working 
1for the immigration agency, which here would be Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
Canada, as opposed to the staff of the Immigration and Refugee Board. 
Canada could do a much better job at clearing its backlog and better processing refugee 
claims, particularly in weeding out the bogus claims, by reassigning responsibility for 
interviewing refugees to the officials at IRCC. The agency also has the advantage of 
having offices in almost every major city in Canada, while the IRB only hears cases in 
Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto, with the 2,500 refugee claimants residing in places 
outside B.C., Quebec and Ontario having to travel long distances for a hearing or having 
to settle for an inferior two-way video hearing. Also, this would avoid the conflict of 
interest at the IRB, which is in charge of reviewing appeals of its own decisions. The IRB 
is better suited to handle appeals of decisions made by IRCC agents who are at arm’s-
length from the IRB.
In addition, Canada should also ensure it maintains a balance in accepting not strictly 
refugees who are most at risk, but also an equal number of refugees who will more easily 
establish themselves in Canada and adapt within one year of landing in Canada. Having 
a system that not only ensures more efficient, effective processing of refugees, with 
proper control over who settles here, will not only help Canadians maintain confidence in 
their refugee and immigration system. It will also ensure that Canada has a system that 
can respond, when necessary, to global crises when they erupt, and better help those 
refugees who need protection.
21. INTRODUCTION
Refugee Policy is a contentious issue in every refugee receiving country in the world. In 
Canada, there is a general consensus that Canada ought to offer protection to those who 
deserve it. However, the consensus breaks down if numbers appear to be too high or if it 
appears that the government has lost control of who comes to Canada. Therefore, an effective 
refugee strategy is an essential component to a successful refugee program. Furthermore, a 
successful refugee program is essential to a successful immigration program in general as lack 
of public support for one component of the program will undermine support for the overall 
immigration program. 
Canada has, from its very origins, has been a refugee receiving country. With the arrival of 
the first Europeans, came refugees: Huguenots from France, Loyalists from the United States, 
African-Americans via the Underground Railroad, Mennonites and Jews from Russia and 
many others long before Canada had a refugee policy of any kind.
This paper will provide an overview of how Canadian refugee policy has evolved since 
the end of the Second World War and will describe the current state of affairs in refugee 
policy, including the good and the bad. The paper will then conclude with a number of 
recommendations for the improvement of Canada’s refugee policy.
2. BACKGROUND
The absence of a refugee policy led to serious abuses such as the refusal to assist refugees, 
mostly Jewish, fleeing from Nazi Europe (Abella and Troper 1968). The first articulation of a 
Canadian refugee policy came in Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s statement to 
the House of Commons on immigration policy on May 1, 1947. In it he stated:
Among other considerations, it [Canadian policy] should take account of persons who are 
displaced and homeless, as an aftermath of the world conflict (Canada 1947, 2644).
Later, in his speech, he was more specific:
The resettlement of refugees and displaced persons constitutes a special problem…Canada 
is not obliged, as a result of membership in the united nations [sic] or under the constitution 
of the international refugee organization [sic], to accept any specific number of refugees 
or displaced persons. We have, nevertheless, a moral obligation to assist in meeting the 
problem, and this obligation we are prepared to recognize (Canada 1947, 2645)
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Canada welcomed 165,697 displaced persons 
from Europe as well as 4,527 Polish Veterans (C&I 1964, L-2), most of whom fought with the 
Polish 1st Armoured Division, which formed part of the First Canadian Army in Northwest 
Europe in 1945.
In 1951, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was approved. It 
defined a refugee as a person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
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of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it (UN 1951, A(1)(2)).
However, the original Convention only applied to Europe and to persons affected by events 
prior to January 1, 1951. Canada, while a participant in drafting the Convention, did not accede 
to the Convention until 1969. In the meantime, for immigration purposes, the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration (C&I) developed its own working definition of refugee which 
referred to a person who:
(a) as a result of events arising out of World War II, was displaced from one European 
country to another, e.g., from an Eastern to a Western European country, and has not been 
permanently re-settled; or
(b) because of fear or dissatisfaction, left one of the under-mentioned countries since the 
closure of the International Refugee Organization on December 31, 1951:
  Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia
  Estonia  Hungary Latvia
  Lithuania Poland  Roumania
  East Zone of Germany  U.S.S.R. Yugoslavia
 and has not been permanently re-settled (C&I 1964, L-1).
Despite not signing the Convention, Canada did co-operate with the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and accepted many refugees referred by the UNHCR. 
Normal selection criteria were still applied with respect to the likelihood of successfully 
establishing in Canada but the terms were relaxed for refugees. Also, any resident of Canada 
or reputable voluntary agency could sponsor a refugee from Europe. In 1962, following the 
introduction of the new Immigration Regulations that eliminated discrimination on the basis of 
race, nationality and country of origin (Canada 1962) refugees from outside Europe could apply 
but had to meet the normal selection criteria though in practice, again, the selection criteria 
were often relaxed (C&I 1964, L-5).
In 1967, the United Nations adopted a Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which served 
to remove the time and geographical limits of the original Convention (UN 1967, Article I, 
Sections 2 and 3). Canada signed the Convention and Protocol in 1969 and from that date, 
immigration officers were instructed to use the Convention definition of refugee. However, it 
was not until 1976, when a new Immigration Act (Canada 1976) was approved by Parliament, 
that Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s commitment to assist refugees first appeared in 
Canadian legislation. Among the objectives of Canadian immigration policy, stated in section 3 
of the new act was:
(g) to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and to uphold 
its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted;
4Also “Convention Refugee” was defined as:
any person who
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, 
(i) is outside the country of the person’s nationality and is unable, or by reason of that fear, 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or 
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of the person’s former 
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to return to that 
country, 
The general authority to admit Convention refugees and persons belonging to refugee-like 
groups but not meeting all the requirements of the refugee definition (Designated Classes) 
was in section 6(2) of the act and categories of admission were described in the Immigration 
Regulations (Canada 1978) that were implemented in 1978 when the Act came into force. 
Section 7 of the Regulations provided for both Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) and for 
Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) as well as for “Designated Classes” to cover refugee-
like situations where it would be difficult to determine cases solely with the refugee definition. 
The timing of these innovations was remarkable as the Indochinese refugee crisis was about to 
break and the new provisions allowed Canada to respond quickly and flexibly to the crisis.1
The Act prescribed the process for determination of refugee status (Canada 1978, S. 45-48). 
The Act provided that the Minister would determine claims but it also established a Refugee 
Status Advisory Committee (RSAC) for the purpose of advising the Minister in respect of 
refugee claims. The committee reviewed the claimant’s written claim and the transcript of his/
her examination by an immigration officer. The committee did not offer in person hearings. 
Negative decisions could be appealed to the Immigration Appeal Board (IAB) (Canada 1978, 
S.40 (1)).
However, the lack of an opportunity for a refugee claimant to make his case in person was a 
fundamental flaw in the 1976 legislation. Also, the process was predicated on a belief that there 
would be very few refugee claims made on Canadian soil. Events proved these assumptions 
wrong and the RSAC and the IAB were overwhelmed by the volume of claims and appeals of 
rejected claims. 
In its famous 1985 “Singh Decision,” the Supreme Court of Canada ruled both that Charter 
protections applied to any person physically in Canada and that the paper process for refugee 
determination, then in place, did not provide the opportunity for an oral presentation by the 
claimant and this constituted a denial of Charter rights (Singh vs. Minister of Employment and 
Immigration, 1985). This was a wise decision as the old process gave claimants no opportunity 
to state their case and to know the Minister’s case against them. In response, the Federal 
Government introduced legislation to create the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) and 
provided that all refugee claimants in Canada would have an in-person hearing before a panel 
of members of the Immigration and Refugee Board. These members are Governor-in-Council, 
that is to say, political appointees. 
1 
For more on Canada’s response, see: Molloy, et al. 2017.
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both by insufficient appointments to the IRB and by the sheer volume of claimants. By 2008, 
there was a backlog of 62,000 claims (Kelley and Trebicock 2010, 445, 446). The problem was 
that the legitimate refugees had to wait in line with all the bogus claims, resulting in waits of 
several years for a decision. The Supreme Court decision only required that claimants being 
refused were entitled to an oral hearing. There could have been a faster process to deal with 
legitimate claims.
The result has been that the IRB almost continually has faced backlogs serving both to delay 
the recognition of legitimate refugees and to give unfounded claimants several years of de facto 
residence in Canada before being found not to be a refugee and being subject to a removal 
order. However, not all those ordered removed would eventually leave Canada. The longer 
they remained in Canada, the greater the likelihood of developing a rationale for remaining 
in Canada, including marriage and children. Some have been, ultimately, allowed to stay 
in Canada under humanitarian and compassionate provisions or by becoming a sponsored 
member of the Family Class. In addition, through the process known as Pre-Removal Risk 
Assessment (PRRA), which is discussed below, about 3% of the 1,875 PRRA applications 
reviewed were allowed to stay in 2014 (IRCC 2016a, 13, Figure 4.3 and 16, Figure 4.6).
3. RECENT CHANGES
With the introduction of the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Regulations 
(Canada 2001 and 2002) in 2002, a major change in how Government Assisted Refugees are 
selected was made. Under the 1976 Act, convention refugees still had to demonstrate that they 
would “be able to become successfully established in Canada” (Canada 1978, S.7 (1)) and this 
was to be assessed against the same criteria as in the points system for economic immigrants 
but without assigning points. It was generally accepted that refugees should be able to establish 
themselves within one year of arrival. This approach was criticized by other refugee receiving 
countries as “skimming the cream off the milk” rather than providing asylum to the most 
needy. However, since 2002, convention refugees are referred to IRCC, generally by the 
UNHCR on the basis of the importance of resettlement (Canada 2002, S. 138 and 140.3). While 
IRCC officers are still supposed to assess the ability to settle successfully, the criteria are much 
less stringent and the timeline for establishment is now three to five years (Canada 2002, S. 
139(1)(g)) and CIC 2009, S 13.9 to 13.14).
On March 30, 2010, then Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason 
Kenney, introduced long overdue reforms to the refugee determination process in Canada 
(Canada 2010). The new proposals, labelled the Balanced Refugee Reform Act aimed to 
conclude refugee determination within sixty days. However, it was unclear how new cases 
could be dealt with in this time period. The Government’s “backgrounder” on the reforms 
stated that “individuals who are determined to be eligible to make an asylum claim would meet 
with a public servant at the IRB within eight days of being referred to the IRB. During this 
information-gathering interview, information on the claim would be collected, forms properly 
completed and a hearing scheduled before another public servant at the IRB within 60 days” 
(CIC 2010).
This was all very good as rhetoric but, as currently organized, the IRB is not in a position 
to meet these time standards. In the IRB’s Department Results Report 2016-17, meeting 
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limited capacity (IRB 2017, 8). It only has field offices in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver 
and, while the bulk of refugee claimants are in those three cities, for the period from January 
2017 to October 2017, over 2,500 claimants were living outside of Quebec, Ontario and British 
Columbia (IRCC 2017a). These claimants are not treated in the same way as claimants where 
the IRB has offices as they will either have to travel to an IRB office, at their own expense, or 
make their all-important claim by video conference. 
The process in place today is summarized by IRCC on its web site so I will not go into it in 
further detail (IRCC 2017b).
4. WHERE WE ARE TODAY
a) In-Canada Refugee Claimants
The new system for in-Canada refugee claims was introduced in 2010 and implemented in 2012. 
Its legal safeguards include the right of appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division (Canada 2001, 
S.110). However an appeal is not available in cases that were considered manifestly unfounded 
or if the claimant came from a country designated as having an independent judicial system and 
other freedoms. Furthermore, the right of appeal does not include the right to an oral hearing. 
Further appeal is available, by leave, to the Federal Court. The government hoped that by having 
the initial decision made by an official and by imposing tight timelines that the process would 
be speedier and backlogs would be reduced. Unfortunately this is not the case. Also, timelines 
for applicants are so short that many advocates for refugees feel that it is impossible to prepare a 
compelling case within those time limits (Canadian Bar Association 2010).
The backlog was significant even before the influx of refugee claimants entering Canada 
illegally from the United States. In 2017, though the 18,149 (IRB 2018a) claimants, entering 
Canadian irregularly from the United States was relatively high, the overall number of 
claimants at 47,425 (IRB 2018b) is not much different from numbers Canada has experienced 
in the past2. As of the end of February 2018, the IRB had 47,451 claims pending and were 
finalizing about 2,000 claims per month, so at the current rate of processing cases the backlog 
represents about two years of processing, on top of the new claims that have averaged about 
4,000 per month over the past year (IRB 2018c). 
While these numbers are significant, we need to maintain perspective. In 2016, 390,000 
undocumented migrants entered Europe and another 5,100 lost their lives in the attempt. In 
2017, the numbers have dropped by half (almost 187,000 people plus another 3,100 who died) 
but are still enormous in comparison to what Canada has to deal with (IOM 2018). 
Nevertheless, the increase in illegal border crossings has the potential to undermine the 
public’s belief that the government has migration under control and, therefore, the consensus 
in support of immigration in general (Globe and Mail, 2018). The best way to prevent an 
increase in illegal border crossings is to use diplomatic pressure on the United States to enforce 
its own laws by dedicating more resources to prevent illegal departures over the Canada/US 
2 
In Canada refugee claims in 2000 numbered 37,748, in 2001 there were 44,640, and in 2008 there were 36,856. Source: 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC 2015, 47).
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(Keung 2017b), there are many people in Canada who believe that the border crossers should 
be welcomed in Canada and a recent poll suggested that more Canadians believe that refugee 
claimants are legitimate than those who believe they are not legitimate (Environics 2018). 
Therefore, any such initiative to reduce the flow of claimants across the border would have to 
take into consideration the strong support for refugee claimants and, therefore, be relatively 
low-key in nature in order not to elicit criticism. Apart from this step, the best approach is to 
make decisions on claims quickly and correctly so that those whose claims are unfounded will 
be removed from Canada rapidly. I suggest, below, a number of options to achieve this.
As noted above, the IRB is not resourced to deal with the numbers that come to Canada. As of 
August 31, 2017, there was a backlog of some 34,000 cases and people were waiting about 16 
months for their hearing rather than the 60 days it is supposed to take, reported Nicholas Keung 
in another Toronto Star article on September 20, 2017 (Keung 2017a). And, as noted earlier, the 
backlog as of February 2018 has grown to over 47,000.
Refugee Claimants are not eligible for most social programs but are given work permits 
while they wait for their case to be determined. The longer people have to wait for a refugee 
hearing, the longer they get to work in Canada. This, in itself, can be an incentive to come to 
Canada and make a refugee claim. Therefore the waiting time for hearings must be shortened. 
How could we shorten the wait times? There are actually many ways. But before we look for 
solutions, we should look at some of the reasons that wait times are so long. 
First of all, if we go back to the Singh Decision, the Supreme Court only ruled that refused 
refugee claimants had to have an oral hearing. The government over-reacted by creating a 
cumbersome system that required every claimant to have an oral hearing. Over the years, there 
have been attempts to accelerate the system by reducing the number of members hearing each 
case and then, in 2012, turning over the initial determination to officials of the IRB. 
However, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) has some twenty offices 
from St. John’s to Vancouver to Yellowknife. If public servants with the IRB are going to 
make the initial refugee determination, why not give this responsibility to public servants with 
IRCC? After all, IRCC officers overseas already do refugee selection abroad. IRCC has the 
network of offices and trained officers in almost every major community in Canada. In almost 
every other country, the initial determination is made by an official of the administrative 
agency for immigration, not a quasi-judicial body. Why are we different? Furthermore, with a 
far larger trained cadre of officers, IRCC can redeploy officers to take on rising workloads. The 
IRB does not have this capacity.
There is also the possibility of conflict of interest in IRB appeal decisions. Will the IRB 
members, at appeal, be more likely to overturn a decision made by an IRCC officer, who they 
do not know, or that of an IRB officer with whom they work closely? Even the perception of a 
conflict of interest due to the absence of an arms-length relationship is a serious breach of the 
principles of fairness in administrative law.
A second reason that our system is cumbersome is that we have also put the cart before the 
horse. A process that forces claimants to have only their refugee claim considered at the 
beginning of the process fails to recognize that there are other ways to qualify for Canadian 
residence and that is what refugee claimants want – Canadian residence - and most do not care 
in what form it comes provided that get it. Today, following a negative decision, unsuccessful 
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Risk Assessment (PRRA) (Canada 2001, S.112-114). The PRRA, originally known as the 
Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada Class (PDRCC), was introduced in the early 
1990s in recognition that there are other risks beyond those in the refugee definition that could 
result in danger to a failed refugee claimant on removal from Canada. With the implementation 
of new the legislation (IRPA) in 2002, (Canada 2001, S.97 (1)), the PDRCC was replaced by the 
PRRA.
The PRRA is carried out by officers of IRCC and examines the circumstances of a claimant 
against other types of risk that may not have been within the purview of the Convention (IRCC 
2017c). This serves also to meet Canada’s international obligations under the Convention 
Against Torture (UN 1987) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1990) and if an 
officer concludes that removal would subject a person to undue risk, that person will be allowed 
to stay. 
Furthermore, an unsuccessful refugee claimant may have humanitarian and compassionate 
(H&C) grounds to stay in Canada, such as close family in Canada and nowhere else. All these 
reasons to remain in Canada should not be left until the end of the process to be considered.
b) Government Assisted Refugees (GARs)
Since the selection changes in 2002, the UNHCR continues to refer the most at risk refugees 
to Canada. This, of course, increases the settlement challenge as the most at risk are often not 
the most readily adaptable to Canada. Furthermore, as source areas for refugees diversify, 
fewer refugees are literate in a western language or any language for that matter. This makes 
acquisition of English or French an even greater challenge. One approach would be to select 
some of the GARs on the basis of ability to establish themselves within a year, as was the case 
prior to 2002. The government announced, in its 2018-2020 Immigration Plan, that the target 
for GARs will be increased from the current 7,500 to 10,000 by 2020 (IRCC 2017d). It may be 
worth considering a 50-50 split between selection of those in most need and those most able 
to establish themselves for a number of reasons. Rapid establishment builds public support 
for the program and budget allocations for the Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) are 
insufficient for the current numbers of GARs and the increasing settlement challenge they 
face (IRCC 2016b, 40). Furthermore, a major hurdle to rapid establishment is the fact that 
the government only loans money to GARs for transportation to Canada and requires it to be 
repaid. The cost of this program is small for the government but it is a huge burden for the 
GAR. The loan program could be replaced by transportation grants. 
c) Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs)
The PSR program has been a huge success and the UNHCR has been encouraging other 
countries to emulate it (UNHCR 2016). However, the program is a victim of its own success. 
For several years the number of PSR applications has outstripped the resources devoted to 
processing PSR applications. A 2007 evaluation of the program noted that long wait-times of 
three years or more are negatively affecting the program (CIC 2007). IRCC has also capped 
the number of applications being accepted so an invisible backlog of applications waiting to be 
submitted by Settlement Agreement Holders (SAHs) exists as well. Measures need to be taken 
to make the program more responsive to demand.
9It is a valid assumption, in most refugee-generating countries, that close relatives of refugees 
are also at risk. We also know that the presence of close relatives helps settlement. A large 
number of PSR applications are for those close relatives, usually siblings. The long process 
to approve the sponsorship application and then to confirm that they are indeed refugees is 
expensive to both Canada and the sponsors. Why bother with this process if the chances are 
almost 100% that the application is for a person at risk? 
Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) and Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) could be 
allowed to sponsor one close relative (brother, sister, cousin) with the support of a group of 
5 sponsors BUT without requiring the relative to be determined to be a refugee. This would 
improve settlement and speed the processing of these people who, otherwise, would clog the 
Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program (PSRP) processing as is the case now.
The PSR program is very cost effective and by involving Canadians personally, helps 
maintain high levels of support for Canada’s refugee programs. It needs to be adequately 
resourced and supported.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
In general, there needs to be the will and the resources within the Government of Canada 
to welcome in the range of 35,000-40,000 refugees annually and to have the plans and 
capacity (not only at IRCC but also at the IRB, Global Affairs, National Defence, CSIS 
and the Provinces) in place to respond quickly to refugee crisis situations. My specific 
recommendations to improve Canada’s refugee policies follow:
a) In-Canada Refugee Claimants
1. The initial decision on a refugee claim should be made by an IRCC officer rather than an 
IRB officer. With the initial decision-making and the appeal process in the same agency 
there is the potential for a serious conflict of interest. The government should amend the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to provide that IRCC officers make the initial 
refugee determination in Canada with the IRB having responsibility to hear appeals, as is 
the case for all other immigrant decisions. 
2. A refugee processing unit should be established in at least one major office in each region 
of Canada. This would allow IRCC officers to consider both refugee status and other 
avenues to permanent residence such as H&C, Convention against Torture, Convention of 
the Rights of the Child and other risks not contemplated by the UN Refugee Convention. 
3. Appeals should be made to the IRB and include the possibility of oral hearings, 
thus paralleling the process for immigrants. As the initial decision would be entirely 
administrative, all refused claimants, who have not made an earlier claim within the 
previous year, ought be able to lodge an appeal.
b) Government Assisted Refugees
4. The commitment to Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) needs to be reaffirmed and 
sufficient resources dedicated to meeting targets. However, we should not commit to only 
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hard to settle GARs. The government should keep the commitment for 5,000 per year for 
UNHCR referred hardship cases but for the remaining GARs return to the requirement that 
in order to be accepted they must be assessed as likely to establish themselves within one 
year of landing. 
5. Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) should be allowed to sponsor one close relative 
(brother, sister, cousin) and immediate family with the support of a group of 5 sponsors 
BUT without requiring the relative to be determined to be a refugee. This will improve 
settlement and speed the processing of these people who, otherwise, would clog the Private 
Sponsorship of Refugees Program processing as is the case now.
6. The RAP program needs to be adequately funded to provide the resources to settlement 
agencies to provide for the increasingly difficult settlement challenges faced by recently 
arrived refugees.
7. The transportation loan program should be replaced by transportation grants. 
(A recent evaluation of the GAR program and RAP makes a number of excellent 
recommendations as well (CIC 2011, 51-58).)
c) Privately Sponsored Refugees
8. The government needs to put in place adequate resources to process PSR sponsorships in 
Canada and PSR applications abroad in a timely fashion and remove the caps currently in 
place.
9. Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) should be allowed to sponsor one close relative 
(brother, sister, cousin) and immediate family with the support of a group of 5 sponsors 
BUT without requiring the relative to be determined to be a refugee. This will improve 
settlement and speed the processing of these people who, otherwise, would clog the Private 
Sponsorship of Refugees Program processing as is the case now.
(More recommendations regarding Privately Sponsored Refugees can be found in a recent 
submission to the government by the Refugee Research Network (Hyndman et al.2016, 2,3).)
d) All Refugees
10. Funding for language training for refugees needs to be increased so that all refugees not 
fluent in either English or French can obtain rapid access to language training.
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper set out to provide an overview of refugee policy since the end of the Second 
World War; to describe the current state of affairs in refugee policy; and, offer a number of 
recommendations for the improvement of Canada’s refugee policy. 
Overall, Canadians can be proud of our refugee policy but that does not mean we can be 
complacent. We still make errors in refugee determination. People at risk still sometimes face 
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the risk of removal and forced return to the situation from which they fled. And we often take 
far too long to approve applicants with a well-founded need to obtain Canada’s protection. 
I believe that the recommendations in this paper would serve to improve, significantly, the 
effectiveness and the level of compassion of Canada’s refugee strategy while still ensuring that 
Canadians are protected from those would abuse our refugee system. They would also serve 
to increase the level of public confidence in refugee programs and, therefore, the immigration 
program in general.
There is a healthy amount of discussion among academicians, refugee advocates, and 
settlement workers. I trust that this paper will contribute to the discussion and help to promote 
improvements in Canada’s refugee policy.
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